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Abstract
Is the political process, with all its difficulties, merely reflective of contemporary constitutionalism? Are the problems an aspect of ongoing inter-communal dialogue? To what extent are existing difficulties exacerbated by a general failure to grasp the difference between the logic of law
and political theory and practice? These questions are addressed here in three basic stages: first,
the relationship between legal logic and political practice is examined; secondly, the implications
of contemporary constitutionalism are explored; and, finally, the agreement and disagreements
over its implementation are analyzed.

ON LAW, POLITICS AND
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONALISM
Colin Harvey*
INTRODUCTION
The Good Friday Agreement ("Agreement")' remains a significant achievement.' The mood of optimism among those
who voted in favor of it may now have eroded, but most participants in the political process still stress that there is no alternative to it. Whether this view of the Agreement survives the Assembly elections in May 2003 - if they take place - is open for
debate. However, with both governments repeatedly stressing
that there is no other way forward, it is hard to see the Agreement becoming as irrelevant as past failed political initiatives.
This has as much to do with the extensive reach of the Agreement, as with the current political reality. At present, its implementation is a priority for the majority of participants in the political process. The political rhetoric is often of "crisis and collapse" and of various failures and breaches of trust which may or
may not "bring down the Agreement." This is the political language of finality, which is based on strong views of the constitutional future of Britain and Ireland. The language of law, which
has its own logic, also involves finality, but in a different sense
that is intrinsic to the stabilizing qualities of legal order. Are
political gains (what it means to talk of a "gain" in politics is, of
course, sharply contested in Northern Ireland) blunted both by
the failure to .translate political commitments into law, and the
inability of participants to recognize the constraints of the governing legal frameworks?
The notion that this may be an extended political process,
involving a complex attempt at conflict management, is fre* Department of Law, University of Leeds. The research for this Article was facilitated by a grant from the British Academy.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Agreement].
2. See Brendan O'leary, The Characterof the 1998 Agreement: Results and Prospects, in
AsPF(:rs oF Ti F BFLFAST AG;REF]MEN- 49 (Rick Wilford ed., 2001) (stating that the Agreement was a major achievement for its negotiators and for the peoples of Ireland and
Britain, emerging from a political desert whose only landmarks were failed "initiatives").
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quently forgotten. Perhaps this simply reflects the governing political culture of insecurity, but in Northern Ireland, it can have
grave consequences. Is the political process, with all its difficulties, merely reflective of contemporary constitutionalism? Are
the problems an aspect of ongoing inter-communal dialogue?
To what extent are existing difficulties exacerbated by a general
failure to grasp the difference between the logic of law and political theory and practice?
These questions are addressed here in three basic stages:
first, the relationship between legal logic and political practice is
examined; secondly, the implications of contemporary constitutionalism are explored; and, finally, the Agreement and disagreements over its implementation are analyzed.
I. LEGAL LOGIC AMD POLITICAL THEORY AD PRACTICE
The political agreements of 1998 had to be translated into
domestic law if they were to have a practical impact. Both the
United Kingdom ("UK") and Irish governments had to enact domestic legal reforms in order to implement the Agreement. This
raises two distinct issues.
First, were the participants in the political negotiations fully
aware of the considerable constraints of established legal doctrines in both jurisdictions? In the UK, for example, the death
of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is much reported.
International law, the European Union ("EU"), and the Acts of
Union with Scotland and Ireland are often cited to prove the
point. However, the main participants in the UK's constitutional
legal system continue to function with the doctrine as the basic
rule of the system. The judiciary, in particular, consistently
makes this point, often during the process of adjudication. Although there are political and legal merits to the argument for a
paradigm shift, if the key participants do not see this, then has it
taken place? Legal academics (this one included) might wish
that it had, but that is a different point. From an internal participant perspective, the fundamentals of the British constitution
appear remarkably unaltered. The debate on whether sovereignty is continuing or procedurally self-embracing in the UK is
perhaps the more interesting one, particularly given the provi-
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sions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 ("1998 Act").' In relation to the operation of the constitutional legal system, parliamentary sovereignty, however interpreted, remains in place. In
practice, the current Labour government in the UK continues to
stress the centrality of the doctrine and its connection to democratic principle. Whether it is stated in the 1998 Act or not (it
is), the Westminster Parliament retains ultimate legal authority
over Northern Ireland. Some of the debates in Northern Ireland on the repeal of previous statute law (for example, on the
Government of Ireland Act)4 , seem to have missed this vital
point, as if statute law had a more secure basis than it in fact has.
The argument that the Acts of Union with Ireland provide the
basis of a "higher law" is weak and would not survive a direct
clash with an Act of Parliament.
The merits of this orthodox view are consistently questioned
(by this author as much as anyone else), but the key participants
in the political process (the UK government in particular) have
not substantively moved away from it as a way of understanding
and explaining what they in fact do. This is true also of the senior judiciary. The danger here is of confusing what one would
wish to be the case with what is actually the case. Political actors
should always work on the basis of the latter while striving to
achieve the former. In practice, the Irish government was prepared to change some of the basic principles of its written constitution. The UK government does not appear to have committed
itself to such a fundamental constitutional change. In fact, traditional British constitutionalism is a significant part of the
problems of Northern Ireland. There is evidence that Republicans understood, or at least now fully understand, this particular
constitutional reality.
This explains why, for example, Sinn Ftin does not view the
Agreement as an end in itself. This is in sharp contrast to the
position of the Social Democratic and Labour Party ("SDLP"),
which advances the argument that the Agreement's design will
remain, even if there is a united Ireland. This perspective also
draws on the implications of membership of the EU for traditional debates on national identity.
3. N. It. Act 1998, ch.47 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1998 Act].
4. Government of Ireland Act, 1920, as amended (Eng.). The Act has now been
repealed.

2003]

LAW, POLITICS AND CONS77TUTIONALISM

Secondly, and more straightforwardly, political agreements
must be translated into domestic legal form in order to have a
practical impact. This is in no way to detract from international
legal commitments. Yet, both States are essentially dualist systems and no enforcement mechanism was put in place at the
international level to address the failure of either government to
implement its commitments. It might have been useful to include some oversight on this matter, but no provision was made.
Therefore, democratic institutions in which political representatives from Northern Ireland have no control ultimately
shape the implementation of the Agreement. With so much left
open, it is not hard to see why the process of implementation
was so extended (this matter is addressed again in the section
that follows). In relation to policing, criminal justice, human
rights, equality, decommissioning, and many other issues, debates continued long after 1998 - and are ongoing at the time
of writing. In no sense, therefore, could the adoption of the
Agreement be seen as a conclusive and comprehensive settlement of many of the contentious issues. Much of the hard work
on policing, criminal justice, and human rights was left to another day.
This is not so much about constructive ambiguity as about
the tension between political practice and the logic of law. In a
democracy where the rule of law is a guiding principle, legal
power is - in theory at least - supreme over political power. If
political actors are to succeed, they have to win the political and
legal argument. There is no guarantee, especially given the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, that political gains will become legal reality.
The argument is not that law is entirely autonomous. However, there are settled criteria in both the UK and Ireland for
determining what is a valid legal argument. These criteria are
accepted and used by all key participants in the legal systems.
More generally, there is a language of law within which a person
can be understood as making statements that are "legal."
Paradigm shifts are possible, particularly in constitutional legal systems undergoing significant change, where the basic rules
have been revised and are now followed and applied. A paradigm shift confined only to legal journals, while intellectually significant, probably does not merit the title. This is not an argu-
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ment in defense of constitutional orthodoxy in either the UK or
Ireland. It is advanced solely to highlight that a paradigm shift
in UK constitutional law must come out of practice informed by
reasoned debate. A shift must have in fact taken place, and participants in the legal order must function as if it has. The danger
in any other approach is that political actors are misled into
thinking they have gained more than they have, and in Northern
Ireland, this can become problematic.
II. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONALISM
The general focus thus far has been on constitutional law
doctrine. In order to develop the argument, some reference
must be made to the broader political doctrine of constitutionalism, understood from an external perspective. This doctrine is
undergoing a transformation with implications for the debate in
Britain and Ireland. It should be stressed that this is part of a
wider theoretical conception of how constitutionalism might be
understood.
The established view of constitutionalism is of an overarching framework of rules and principles, which stands above, and
is detached from, social and political life. The constitution is
thus viewed as the foundation of the system and the constraining
device, which defines the limits of political and administrative
action. This is often how the rule of law is understood in popular usage.
This view of constitutionalism has been called into question
by what, for convenience, may be termed "process-based" models. The focus of the alternative model is on constitutionalism as
an ongoing and open-ended dialogue. Constitutionalism, according to this model, can function without a formal constitution and is not necessarily confined to the State. The constitution thus becomes something that is re-imagined within the
processes of ongoing political and legal engagement. Rather
than view this as problematic, because it does not respect the
value of legal certainty, the argument is that this model respects
the dynamics of political life and ensures that each generation
can engage usefully with political and legal debate. As James
Tully argues, people have removed modern constitutionalism
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from its "imperial throne and put it in its proper place." 5 Constitutional documents may provide the basis upon which this dialogue takes place, but they are not the sole determinants of practical outcomes. This model encourages certain scepticism about
the idea of a constitutional settlement as something abstract and
imposed. Rather, the constitution, which should arise from real
and not imagined discussion, should operate so as to promote
an ongoing dialogue. While inclusive negotiations can take
place, and documents emerge, the agreement reached is not
necessarily the last word. This allows room for future constitutional dialogues within which an agreement might be reached
and forms of accommodation developed, which are appropriate
in order, for example, to respect cultural differences. The constitution is, therefore, understood as a conversation, which can
transcend the boundaries of a particular State, and involve a diverse range of political actors. While this is sometimes used as a
way of understanding constitutionalism in the EU, it is equally
useful in thinking about ongoing constitutional politics within
the UK and Ireland. This "conversational" view of constitutionalism is open to caricature. To the critics of this view, "conversation" sounds like too smug and cozy a description of the messy
world of democratic politics. But conversations are not always
like this. They can be uncomfortable and contentious. The
rules of civility are implied, lie in the background, and are understood to exist, even when breached. The idea of constitutionalism as an ongoing conversation has merit. In particular, it captures the open-ended nature of democratic dialogue, and also
brings in voices neglected when only orthodox legal views are
used as a guide to political processes.
III. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT, LAW AND POLITICS
A. The Three-Stranded Approach
1. Consociational, Confederal and Federal:
The Political Framework
The Agreement is a complex document; it is consociational,
confederal, and federal in nature.6 From the perspective of po5. SeeJAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
184 (1995).
6. See Brendan O'Leary, The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM
(19991.
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litical science, Brendan O'Leary classifies it as a complex consociational agreement.7 He lists four consociational elements: executive power sharing, proportionality, communal autonomy
and equality, and minority veto rights.8 The confederal elements are the all-Ireland confederal relationship and the BritishIrish confederal relationship.'j In addition, O'Leary notes both
the UK-Northern Irish federalizing process, and the Irish federalizing process." ° These elements are all linked together in the
three-stranded approach of the Agreement: Strand One on
democratic institutions in Northern Ireland; Strand Two on allIreland mechanisms; and Strand Three on British-Irish relations.
This imaginative political framework, which also reflects an
international legal agreement between the UK and Ireland, had
to be mapped onto domestic law and practice. The Irish government, for example, altered its constitution to reflect the new
consensus on the notion of Irish unity - i.e. it did not abandon
the idea. Legal changes were also made to allow the new allIreland bodies to function. In the UK, the 1998 Act reflected
many of the key aspects of the Agreement. Subsequent legal
changes have also been aimed at implementation, although
there are continuing disputes as to the extent to which law reflects the spirit and substance of the Agreement. In addition,
the suspension of the democratic institutions by the British government has raised the question of compliance with the Agreement. The provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 2000 ("2000
Act") cannot be traced to the document. Yet, they confirm the
fact that parliamentary sovereignty remains one of the basic
rules of British constitutional law. The 2000 Act reinforced the
fact that the democratic institutions in Northern Ireland are
subordinate in nature. While the Irish government, and the Nationalist and Republican political parties in Northern Ireland
raised concerns, no effective legal mechanism existed to contest
such action.
This raises the pressing matter of whether the available legal
tools adequately capture the complexity of the Agreement and
the understandings which political actors have of it. The sugges7. See id. at 1630.
8. See id. at 1630. See also id. at 1631-41 (for full discussion of these elements).
9. See id. at 1641-47.
10. See id. at 1646-49.
11. Police (N. Ir.) Act 2000, ch.32 (Eng.).
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tion here is that the Agreement has not led to the same sort of
constitutional re-think in Britain as it has in Ireland. One result
is that the current legal framework can simply make matters
worse. The confederal and federal elements of the Agreement
have suffered as a result. If the Irish government does not assertively defend these aspects of the Agreement and highlight
breaches, there are few other effective mechanisms available.
2. Disagreement and the New Institutions
As is well known, implementation continues to cause significant problems. At the time of writing, the institutions are still
suspended. The aim here is to examine some of the disputes
surrounding the implementation of the Agreement. The focus
below is on disagreements within the institutions and the use of
the courts to resolve them.
The first issue relates to the policy of resignation within the
institutions. The First Minister of Ireland, David Trimble, resigned on July 1, 2001, as a result of his frustration over the lack
of movement on Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA")
decommissioning. This meant that the then Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon of the SDLP, (succeeded by Mark Durkan),
also ceased to hold office on that date, because of the requirement that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister must
both be elected and hold office jointly. The Deputy First Minister, however, in line with Section 16(7) of the 1998 Act, continued to exercise the functions of his office. Trimble_ designated
Reg Empey of the Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP") to fulfil the
functions of First Minister for this period.
Section 16 of the 1998 Act sets out a six-week period for new
elections to these offices, where a resignation has taken effect.
Attempts were made by the British and Irish governments to address the situation, resulting in the Weston Park talks in July
2001. As a result of these talks, on July 14, 2001, the British and
Irish governments produced Achievements in the Implementation of
the Good Friday Agreement.' 2 As the deadline for action approached, the Independent International Commission on
Decommissioning ("IICD") reported on August 6, 2001 that
PIRA had agreed on a method to put its arms completely and
verifiably beyond use. This offer was withdrawn after the Secre12. Copy of this paper is available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/press/010714z.htm.
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tary of State suspended devolution on August 10, 2001. The
one-day suspension under the 2000 Act was used as a technical
device to trigger another six weeks of negotiation. Devolution
was rapidly restored. This period failed, however, to produce an
agreement, and on September 21, 2001, the Secretary of State
suspended devolution again for a short period, leaving another
six weeks for further talks. In October of 2001, Trimble decided
to withdraw his Ministers from the Northern Ireland Executive,
and things looked grim for the Assembly. However, a report
from the IICD on October 23, 2001, revealed that the body had
witnessed an event carried out by the PIRA with which it was
satisfied: the PIRA had started the process of putting its arms
completely and verifiably beyond use. This was enough to encourage Trimble to bring his Ministers back into the Executive.
The process of electing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister commenced.
The relevant section of the 1998 Act provides: "Two candidates standing jointly shall not be elected to the two offices without the support of a majority of the members voting in the election, a majority of the designated Nationalists voting and a majority of the designated Unionists voting."" The difficulty for
Trimble was that he did not command the support of his entire
Assembly team. Two UUP Assembly members, Peter Weir and
Pauline Armitage, stated that they were unlikely to support him
in his bid for re-election as First Minister. Mallon decided not to
run again and Mark Durkan (current leader of the SDLP) was
proposed to replace him. The election process took place on
Friday November 2, 2001.
It is worth noting that the Assembly is permitted to alter its
standing orders through a cross-community vote (the support of
60% of the voting members, 40% of the designated voting Nationalists, and 40% of the designated voting Unionists). In an
attempt to ensure a successful election, the Northern Ireland
Women's Coalition sought an amendment to the standing orders to permit them to re-designate. They succeeded in changing the standing orders to allow a re-designation, having immediate effect after notification, in writing, to the Speaker (originally the standing orders required a notice period of thirty
days). These letters were placed with the Speaker, and revealed
13. 1998 Act, supra n.3, Sec. 16(3).
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the decision of the Women's Coalition to re-designate one MLA
as a Unionist and one as a Nationalist.
The Assembly then moved to elect the First Minister and
Deputy First Minister. Despite the re-designation, the attempt
failed. Out of fifty-nine possible Unionist votes, twenty-nine
voted "yes" (49.2%). The Assembly was adjourned. The deadline of six weeks ended at midnight on Saturday November 3,
2001. However, the Secretary of State opted to allow the Assembly to meet on Monday November 5, 2001, to have another election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Focused discussions took place over the weekend in an attempt to persuade
members of the Alliance Party to re-designate as Unionists. On
Monday November 5, 2001, the Assembly met for further discussion. An additional amendment to the standing orders was proposed:
From 5 November 2001, until the commencement of a review
under paragraph 36 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement,
Standing Order 3(8) has effect as if it read:
"A Member may change his/her designation of identity. Any
such change takes effect immediately after notification in
writing is submitted to the Speaker. Any subsequent change
shall take effect seven days after the day of such notifica14
tion."

Because of a Petition of Concern, the Assembly did not vote
on this on November 5, 2001. There was a vote the subsequent
day, November 6, 2001, and the amendment was agreed upon.
Meanwhile, as a result of a legal challenge, the Secretary of State
accepted that he was under a duty to propose a date for elections. It became clear that with the proposed re-designation of
members of the Alliance Party, the election would succeed on
this occasion. On November 6, and after the vote on the standing orders was taken, three Assembly members of the Alliance
Party re-designated as Unionists. On this occasion Trimble and
Durkan were elected as First Minister and Deputy First Minister,
respectively. Of the sixty Unionist votes, thirty-one were "yes"
votes, thus giving the needed majority (51.7%). There was hope
at the time that this would bring a period of stability to devolution, if not to Northern Ireland as a whole. However, the DUP
14. Northern Ireland Assembly, Order Paper Monday 5 November 2001, available
3-01 revised.htin.

at http://www.ni-assembly.gov.uk/orders/papers/orderl
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launched a legal challenge to the process, arguing that the deadline had passed and the election was therefore unlawful with reference to the 1998 Act. The challenge ended up in the House
of Lords. Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and
Others addressed the challenge by Peter Robinson to the legal
validity of the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister more than six weeks after the restoration of devolved government on September 23, 2001." Robinson lost before the
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, but opted to pursue the case
all the way to the House of Lords, where he lost again. The individual judgments are worth exploring. They offer insights into
judicial thinking on the Agreement and the 1998 Act.
The majority (Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Millett)
adopted a very generous interpretation of the Act, based upon a
liberal reading of its underlying purpose. As Lord Bingham
noted, "the provisions should, consistently with the language
used, be interpreted generously and purposively, bearing in
mind the values which the constitutional provisions are intended
to embody.""' Lord Hoffmann called the 1998 Act "a constitution for Northern Ireland" which is "framed to create a continuing form of government."' 7 The fundamental purpose of the
Agreement is, according to Hoffmann, "to create the most favourable constitutional environment for cross-community government."h The majority concluded that the election was legally
valid and the Secretary of State was entitled to propose the date
of May 1, 2003 for the next Assembly elections. Two judges,
Lords Hobhouse and Hutton, dissented. In taking this line, they
were following the dissent of the Lord ChiefJustice of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, Sir Robert Carswell. Lord Hutton,
sticking closely to the relevant statutory provisions, was not persuaded by the majority view. In fact, he implied that the majority
allowed the purpose of the Agreement to override the meaning
of the words in the Act. He argued that "whilst those sections
continue in force un-amended, I consider that the objective of
the Belfast Agreement cannot operate to alter the meaning of
15. See Robinson v. Sec'y of State for Northern Ireland and Others, [2002] A.C. 32,
available at http://http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200102/
Idjudgmt/jd020725/robin- I.htm.
16. See id. at para. 11.
17. See id. at para. 25.
18. See id.at para. 30.
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their words."19 By a margin of three to two, the First Minister
and Deputy First Minister overcame this particular legal hurdle.
The judgment was greeted with relief byJohn Reid, the-then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
The architecture of the Agreement has taken on a legal
form, where law is used as a tool to promote political co-operation. Given this fact, it was always predictable that disagreements
would be resolved in the courts. The "contractual" approach of
Sinn Fein, in particular, is perhaps understandable given the
limited bargain it in fact struck in 1998. This was highlighted
when the First Minister refused to nominate Sinn Fin's Ministers to the North-South Ministerial Council meetings. Bairbre
de Brun and Martin McGuinness sought judicial review of the
refusal to nominate them. The case ended up in the Northern
Ireland Court of Appeal ("NICA")."' The relevant legal provision was section 52 of the 1998 Act, read in conjunction with
paragraphs five and six of Strand Two of the Agreement. In October and November of 2000, the First Minister refused to sign
the relevant nomination papers. His reason was that "such an
approach will be likely to persuade Sinn Fain to use any influence it may have to secure decommissioning of paramilitary
arms in accordance with the Belfast Agreement."'2 ' The decision
raised fears about a failure to recognize the interlocking nature
of all the dimensions of the Agreement. Concern was expressed
during the negotiations that led to the Agreement that there
might be interference with the North-South dimension. The attempt to give the North-South Ministerial Council an autonomous existence failed. The First Minister, in his attempt to
achieve his political aims, thus triggered some deep-seated concerns. Trimble's decision (then acting First Minister Reg Empey
continued to enforce the ban) was declared unlawful by both the
High Court and NICA. The First Minister had effectively sought
to use the institutions to achieve the strategic political objectives
of his party and community. The end result was clear - the
First Minister had acted unlawfully.
The case turned on the meaning of the relevant provisions
of the 1998 Act, viewed in the light of the Agreement. The
19. See id. at para. 61.
20. See In re Bairbre de Brun, [2001] NICA 43, available at http://www.courtsni.
gov.uk/j udgments/carf3482.htm.
21. Id.
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Agreement and the Act deal with the nominating process and
the work of the Council. Section 52(1) of the 1998 Act provides:
(1) The First Minister and the deputy First Minister acting
jointly shall make such nominations of Ministers and junior
Ministers (including where appropriate alternative nominations) as they consider necessary to ensure(a) such cross-community participation in the North-South
Ministerial Council as is required by the Belfast Agreement;
and
(b) such cross-community participation in the British-Irish
Council as is so required.2 2
On the requirements of the Agreement, the relevant section provides:
Participation in the Council to be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the two Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish
Government and the First and Deputy First Minister in the
case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able to
make alternative arrangements. 23
The current Lord Chief Justice is not known for his liberality when it comes to statutory interpretation - as the Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission discovered. In his judgment
he agreed, in large part, with the conclusions reached by KerrJ.
in the High Court. For example, he accepted the questionable
conclusion that it was not obligatory to nominate the Minister
responsible for the topic to be discussed at a particular Council
meeting. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister had discretion in this area. Carswell LCJ was reluctant to spell out precisely the boundaries of this discretion. KerrJ., for example, had
referred specifically to the concept of "suitability," a term which
attracted criticism as highly inappropriate. In contrast, Carswell
LCJ preferred to reserve his opinion until it was necessary to decide the matter. This was unfortunate at the time, as it was the
clear parliamentary intention that a refusal to participate normally would be the only exception to the formal nomination of
the relevant Minister. Carswell LCJ considered, but rejected, the
argument on the basis that if Parliament had intended this, it
would have said so.
22. 1998 Act, supra n.3 Sec. 52(1).
23. Agreement, supa ii.,

Strand Two: North South Ministerial Council, Sec. 2.
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The issue on which the First Minister lost (and one not accurately represented in some of the commentary) was the collateral purpose he was seeking to achieve. Kerr J. held that the
First Minister was pursuing a collateral purpose -putting pressure on Sinn Fain to persuade the PIRA of the pressing need for
decommissioning - and Carswell LCJ agreed. The purpose of
Section 52 of the 1998 Act is, as he stated, to facilitate the work
of the North-South Ministerial Council. The First Minister and
the Deputy First Minister are obliged to carry out this statutory
purpose. He acknowledged that decommissioning was another
substantial purpose of the Act, but that it was not the only one.
Therefore, the First Minister's refusal was an incorrect exercise
of his discretion under Section 52.
Other institutions were created as a result of the Agreement. One of these, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, also pursued a dispute through the courts and the results are worth exploring. The Commission has experienced
some resistance to its work thus far and has received criticism
from a wide range of individuals and groups. In re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is a useful example of judicial attitudes to the Commission in particular. 24 The case arose following the Commission's attempt to intervene as a third party during the inquest into the Omagh bombing, and led to an
unsuccessful judicial review action. HM Coroner, for Fermanagh and Tyrone, concluded that the Commission did not have
the power to intervene as a third party. This decision was upheld by Carswell LCJ in judicial review proceedings.
The judgment was severely criticized by the Commission
and runs counter to the relevant provisions of the legislation,
and parliamentary intent. What is odd, is that until this time, the
Commission had made several useful interventions in other
cases. The appeal from the judgment of Carswell LCJ was heard
by the NICA. The earlier decision was upheld. In his dissenting
judgment, Kerr J. stated:
In my opinion, the Commission has been given an overall
role in advancing the observance of human rights. On that
account it should be permitted to apply to intervene in pro24. See In re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (Northern Ireland),
[2002] A.C. 25, available at http: //http: //www.courtsni.gov.uk/judgments/judgments+
2001 .htm.
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ceedings since that is reasonably incidental to the function
that it has been required by the statute to perform viz to advance the observance of human rights.25
The majority (McCollum LJ and Sir John MacDermott), however, adopted a rather narrow approach to the 1998 Act. McCollum LJ stated:
Having accepted Mr. MacDonald's invitation to read not only
the Act itself but also the materials provided by the Belfast
Agreement and the published commentary thereon and details of the Parliamentary debate, I am firmly in agreement
with the view expressed by the Lord Chief Justice that Parliament did not intend to and did not invest powers in the Commission either to intervene as an interested party or to act as
amicus curiae. It appears to me that the powers granted by the
Act either to bring proceedings in its own name or to give
assistance to individuals engaged in proceedings are quite adequate to ensure that the Commission is able to make a substantial contribution to the observance of human rights in
Northern Ireland and to the involvement of the courts in that
26
process.

The Human Rights Commission sought and was granted
leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The judgments of Carswell LCJ, McCollum LJ, and Sir John MacDermott display a particularjudicial attitude to human rights and statutory interpretation. They demonstrate that there may be a struggle "against the
judiciary" in Northern Ireland to ensure that the Commission's
work is respected and that human rights protection is accorded
due recognition. On this occasion, the majority was unprepared
to follow the express logic of parliamentary intention and the
clear purpose of this aspect of the 1998 Act. It may thus be the
case that Parliament should express its intention more precisely
in this area in the future. The approach, however, reflects a critical attitude to the work of this public body and one can only
speculate as to why this might be the case. Judicial resistance to
public bodies established to promote progressive political and
legal values is not unknown, and the Commission is not the first
statutory body to engage in a "battle with the judges."
25. See In the Matter of an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission forJudicial Review, [2002] NICA 17, available at http://www.courtsni.gov.
uk/judgments/mcc3369.htm.
26. See id.
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The majority in the House of Lords took a rather different
view of the Commission. In re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission essentially provided clarification of the powers/capacities
of the Commission. It ended in a victory for the Commission
with the majority (Lords Slynn, Woolf, Nolan, and Hutton) prepared to adopt a generous approach. This case is a valuable lesson for the government: if you want something, it should, in the
future, be inserted into statutory provisions. All this could have
been avoided if the government had accepted an amendment
proposed by Kevin McNamara MP during the passage of the legislation. As noted, a majority in the Northern Ireland Court of
Appeal had dismissed the Commission's appeal. In other words,
the Commission lost at that stage. Thus, the case eventually ended up before the House of Lords. At the core of the case, was
the issue of whether the Commission had the power/capacity to
intervene in court proceedings (as an intervener or amicus curiae). The majority decided that the Commission did have the
capacity to intervene. As Lord Slynn stated: "[i]f the court wants
or is willing to have such submissions, the Commission has the
capacity to make them as part of the function of promoting the
understanding of human rights law."27 The Commission won its
case, but the matter never should have ended up in the courts.
What might we learn from these cases? The obvious lesson
is the significance of the judicial role in settling disputes, which
have arisen in the institutions. Note also that the current Lord
Chief Justice was on the losing side in two of these cases. In
contrast, Justice Kerr was singled out for positive comment in the
House of Lords. Several matters stand out. First, the Northern
Irish judges were not afraid to rule against the First Minister
when the law required them to do so. Secondly, the majority in
the House of Lords appeared to be prepared to adopt a generous interpretation of the 1998 Act and the Agreement based
upon the understanding that they constitute a constitution for
Northern Ireland. Finally, the approach to the Human Rights
Commission was again more generous in the House of Lords
than in Northern Ireland. Perhaps these judges in London, just
like many politicians at Westminster, desperately want to see the
democratic experiment work.
Unlike questions over suspension, or broader political chal27. See In re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, supra n.24, at para. 25.
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lenges to the interpretation of the Agreement, the disputes examined above were resolved by the courts. These judgments did
not significantly alter political behavior. Threats of non co-operation and of possible resignation continued. But a mechanism
did exist to contest political action taking place within the terms
of the law. This "new constitution" has therefore acted as a constraining device, if only to provoke political actors into adopting
different strategies for achieving their objectives. In addition,
political actors have had to translate their political arguments
into legal ones in order to succeed. There is evidence, from
some of the judges, of a willingness to understand the purpose
of the Agreement and to facilitate it. This does not bring finality,
but does offer a mechanism to encourage the ongoing process
of implementation.
CONCLUSION
The direct implication of the argument advanced here is
that the implementation of the Agreement will be a long and
drawn-out process, which will inevitably be contested at almost
every stage. Taking contemporary process-based understandings
of constitutionalism seriously, the argument is that this is not as
fatal a prospect as is often stated. In fact, the language of "crisis
and collapse" has become a central aspect of the wider constitutional process itself and often forms part of a tactical approach
to politics. There are, of course, those who argue strongly
against the Agreement and who see all of this as a symptom of
failure. They fall into two broad camps.
The first group finds consociationalism distasteful and argues that it promotes "sectarianism. '2 8 In crude terms, this
group would like to see a move to a more "civic" notion of democracy in Northern Ireland. Members of this group, however,
are prepared to take up positions within the new institutions and
make their case from within. The extent to which this group,
28. See John McGarry, "Democracy" in Northern Ireland: Expeiments in Self-Rule from
the Protestant Ascendancy to the Good l,(day Agreement, in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 451
(2002). McGarry argues convincingly that this view is mistaken. Some are not persuaded. See also Donald L. Horowitz, The Northern heland Agreement: Clear, Consociational, and Risky, in NORTIIHERN IREI)ND AND THE DivDED WORLD: POsT-AGRFEMENT
NORTHERN IRELAND IN COMPARATiVE PERSPECnVF 89-108 (John McGarry ed., 2001). See
also Rick Wilford, Designing the Northern heland Assembly, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 577
(2000).

20031

LAW, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

1013

sometimes neglected, can undermine the Agreement should not
be underestimated.
The second main group is Unionist in political outlook. The
argument here has the virtue of political honesty. This group
does not like the Agreement because it is alleged to be a bad
deal for unionism. In addition, the argument now is that there
is no longer majority support within the Unionist community for
it. One implication of contemporary constitutionalism is that if
a community simply does not accept a constitution and in fact
views it as an unwelcome imposition, then a constitutional dialogue must take place. An implication of contemporary constitutionalism therefore, which many find problematic, is precisely
that nothing is "off the agenda" forever, in the way suggested by
traditional constitutional thinking. This may become relevant in
Northern Ireland, however, because the ongoing dialogue is
about the implementation of the Agreement and making the institutions work. The two governments, in particular, have ruled
out the idea of re-negotiation of the Agreement. The ongoing
practical dialogue will therefore take place within the agenda set
by this document.
By way of conclusion, there are two suggestions here, both
equally tentative. First, the logic of the Agreement will "work
itself out" in ongoing and continuing political and legal dialogue. This is the way that constitutionalism now works. This
means that even when some of the institutions are not functioning, the debate tends to occur within the new political language
created by the Agreement. Most of those who refuse to participate, do so on the basis of insufficient implementation of the
Agreement. The politics of "crisis and collapse" is not as fatal for
the long-term politics of Northern Ireland as some have suggested. A process is underway, even when the institutions are
not operational. This process started long before 1998. However, where a political community rejects the imposition of a
constitution, these views, if well founded, must be taken seriously. Ways must then be found to bring that community fully
within the ongoing constitutional dialogue.
Secondly, while legal mechanisms are useful in highlighting
the constraints of the normative order, insufficient attention was
paid in the Agreement to the reality of established constitutional
legal doctrine in the UK. The UK was effectively permitted to
escape the sort of comprehensive constitutional re-thinking that
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has taken place in Ireland. The result is that the all-Ireland confederal elements are weakened, and the distinctive nature of selfdetermination in the Irish context is insufficiently acknowledged. In my view, and contrary to the now dominant logic of
the political process, the claims of Irish Nationalist and Republican political actors in Northern Ireland have not been accorded
sufficient weight during the process of implementation. Despite
the express language of the Agreement, Irish Nationalists and
Republicans have found themselves locked within the dominant
legal paradigm of devolutionary thinking within a wider UK context.2 9 The terms of this existence have altered to include important guarantees on human rights and equality, but some of
the basic features remain unchallenged."' It is surprising that
more work was not done on this at the time the Agreement was
negotiated. It may reflect a tacit acknowledgement of political
reality, but it was not presented that way. However, it is not the
Agreement which is at fault here. The significance of the
changes proposed in the Agreement was simply never fully recognized at the heart of the constitutional legal system in the UK.
29. For the contrasting views of the SDLP and Sinn Fain, see Alban Maginness,

Refining Northern Nationalism, in CUANGING
THE UNION AND

SHADES OF ORANGE AND GREEN:

THE NATION IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND

and Mitchel McLaughlin, Redefining Republicanism, in
GRFEN:

REDEFINING

33-40 (John Coakley ed., 2002)

CHANGING SHADES OF ORAN;E AND

REDEFINING THE UNION AND THE NATION IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND, supra, at

41-47. McLaughlin states that Sinn Fain does not view the Agreement as an end in
itself. "The Good Friday Agreement is not for Irish Republicans an end in itself, but an
agreement with the potential to deliver full national democracy in Ireland." Id. at 45.
McLaughin also displays an awareness of the legal limitations, although the argument
about the Government of Ireland Act is not accurate. He states: "The constitutional
reality is that the British still hold jurisdiction over a part of Ireland, although that has
been significantly qualified by the repealing of the Government of Ireland Act. The
political reality if we are to attain our goals requires a process of transition to a united
Ireland." Id. It should be stressed that the Agreement recognizes the right to pursue
democratically national and political aspirations. .See Agreement, suptra n.], Sec. 6, para.
1.
30. See Jennifer Todd, The Reorientation o1 ConstitutlionalNationalism, in CHANGING
SIHADES OF ORANGE AND GREEN:

RARY IRELAND, sup~ra n.29, at

REDEFINING THE UNION AND

TtIE NATION IN CONTEMPO-

71-83. Todd's other proposed outcome sounds more realis-

tic. In this context, a resurgence of northern nationalism would be likely, with implications for the island of Ireland. Beyond repeating the mantra that the Agreement must
be fully implemented, nationalists and republicans need to determine their substantive
politics and outline precisely how the goal of Irish unity will be achieved. Northern
nationalism still needs to be redefined properly within post-Agreement Ireland. In fact,
.Jennifer Todd argues that with a de-emphasis on Europe and greater linkages and devolution within the UK, northern nationalism could become simply a form of British regionalism, with republicans holding on to the objective of Irish unity.

